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Introduction  
Welfare in the United States has a rich history dating back to the Great 
Depression era. Although the welfare program is based upon the foundation of helping 
needy children, several reforms have since been added to include programs and policies 
from which all members of a family can now reap benefits. In 1996, President Bill 
Clinton reformed Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) with the Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA, U.S. 
Public Law 104-193). This Act was the most crucial reform made to welfare since 
Franklin D. Roosevelt started the original program in 1935. The PRWORA created many 
changes to welfare, with the primary emphasis on moving families from welfare-to-work.  
By 1997, studies showed that welfare caseloads declined by as much as 31 % 
nation-wide, while declines exceeded more than 50 % in states like Alabama, Colorado, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, Oregon, South Carolina, and Tennessee (Sanford & Soss, 1998). 
In August of 1996, 4.41 million American families were on welfare, and by September 
2001, only 2.20 million families received welfare benefits (U.S. Department of Health 
and Human Services, 2002).  These figures provided a seemingly strong indication that 
welfare reform was a success. 
While supporters insisted that the new welfare reform was a success, literature 
regarding this topic has had mixed conclusions about what actually led to the rapid 
decline of caseloads in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Critics of the reform argued that 
the reduction in welfare caseloads was simply due to a booming economy that allowed an 
increase in employment. Danielson and Klerman (2008), who presented an in-depth study 
of this topic, stated “It may be premature to characterize welfare reform as a dramatic 
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success, even from a restricted point of view of caseload reduction” (pg. 703). Criticisms 
also included claims that the welfare system still was not effective in moving welfare 
recipients from chronic dependency on the system (Danielson et al 2008). 
This paper will explore welfare reform in the United States and take a look at its 
development from a historical perspective. Many different reforms have contributed to 
what makes up welfare in the United States today. However, will welfare reform be an 
ongoing political issue with each Presidential administration as times change? 
Methodology  
 The methodology for this research will be a comprehensive literature review. 
This methodology will be used to give an in-depth analysis of the history of welfare 
reform and provide insight on the trends of reform throughout various points in history. 
The sequential analysis of the historical approach outlined in this paper can be found in 
the table below: 
Table 1: Sequential Outline of Welfare Reform 
Welfare Program Time Period Reform 
Mothers’ Pension Plan 1911-1935 Title IV of the Social 
Security Act 
Aid to Dependent Children 
(ADC) 
1935- 1962 President John F. Kennedy’s 
“New Frontier” 
Amendments 
Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children 
(AFDC) 
1962-1996 The Family Support Act 
(1988) and The Personal 
Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Act of 1996 
(PRWORA) 
Temporary Assistance to 
Needy Families (TANF) 
1996-Present N/A 
The literature review will also contain three articles where several researchers 
tested the effectiveness of welfare reform. The insight of these articles can help determine 
the research question, which asks if welfare reform will need to be addressed frequently 
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as times and Presidential administrations change. The articles used in this analysis were 
selected due to the following criteria: (1) sample groups included programs that were or 
had the same characteristics as the welfare reform established by PRWORA (such as 
work and financial incentives and parental responsibility sanctions) and (2) used a quasi-
experimental design in order to collect non-bias data; and (3) covered at least five years 
in order to draw results that are more conclusive. 
Literature Review 
Mothers’ Pension Plans (1911 -1935) 
The original national, federal welfare program stemmed from The Social Security 
Act through Title IV, signed by President Franklin Roosevelt in 1935. This program was 
founded to help support children in needy families, particularly in lieu of the worst 
economic conditions the United States has ever faced, the Great Depression. Before a 
national federal welfare program was started, several states had similar programs in place 
that assisted needy families (Coll, 1995). 
 In 1911, Illinois became the first state to implement a statewide program to assist 
needy mothers with children. The program was known as the “mother’s pension plan”. 
The mothers’ pension plan was created to assist families that had dependent children with 
no male income. Although the law that created the mothers’ pension plan was statewide, 
it did not mandate counties within the state to participate in the program. Cook County, 
however, had the largest development of the program. The Cook County Juvenile Court 
administered the mothers’ pension program. Due to its success, it was used for study by 
other states (Leff, 1973).  
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 The mothers’ pension plan model began to spread rapidly after the apparent 
success of the program in Illinois. By 1913, eighteen states enacted mothers’ pension 
plans or aid to mothers and by 1920 forty states assisted mothers with dependent 
children. The laws regarding the programs varied slightly between the states. For 
example, seventeen states allowed single fathers to receive assistance for needy children, 
and all but five states had citizenship requirements of at least one year for immigrants. 
Finally, state programs varied regarding the length of time that a family could receive 
benefits. All states allowed families to draw benefits until the dependent child was legally 
old enough to work. These ages varied from age thirteen in West Virginia, to age 
seventeen in many other states (Lundberg, 1921) .  
Aid to Dependent Children (1935-1962) 
Due to limited local funds during the Great Depression, the economic downturn 
phased out Mothers’ Pension Programs; however, its structure and goal became the 
foundation for Title IV of the Social Security Act’s Aid to Dependent Children Program 
(ADC).   Like the Mothers’ Pension Program, ADC was designed to help single or 
widowed mothers supplement the income and necessities that the absent male-bread 
winner was unable to provide. The ADC plan was composed by the directors of the U.S. 
Children’s Bureau in the Department of Labor, who lobbied to get the plan added to the 
Social Security Act (Bell, 1965). 
The ADC program provided cash assistance to a parent that had a low-income 
dependent child under the age of sixteen who did not have the support of at least one 
parent due to the parent’s absence from the home, the parent’s lack of mental capability, 
or death. The first three decades of the program was similar to private charity. 
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Participation in the ADC program was voluntary among states. The oversight of the 
federal government regarding civil rights of applicants was non-existent, and states also 
had discretion on who could receive benefits, often leaving children of color ineligible. In 
the mid-1960s, an organization was formed by a group of African-American women 
known as the National Welfare Rights Organization. The organization worked with 
lawyers and law groups and filed countless lawsuits against the ADC to challenge its 
discriminatory behavior against minorities. This and other questions raised regarding the 
functioning of ADC and its policies on who was allowed to receive benefits introduced 
the beginning of the need for welfare reform (Bell, 1965). 
Aid to Families of Dependent Children (AFDC) (1962-1996) 
New Frontier Reform 
When President John F. Kennedy accepted the Democratic candidacy for 
President in 1960, his acceptance speech entitled “The New Frontier” eventually became 
the phrase that identified the Kennedy administration policies. Part of the New Frontier 
policies included several changes to the ADC program (Wiltse, 1964). One of the 
essential changes to AFDC included what individuals were eligible to receive assistance. 
In 1961, a second parent in a family with an “incapacitated” or unemployed spouse could 
receive assistance, and by 1968, any other individual in the home who was “essential” to 
the child could also receive benefits. Due to the variety of members in a family who 
became eligible for benefits, the name of the program was changed from Aid to 
Dependent Children (ADC) to Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC).  By 
1964, nearly one million families received AFDC benefits (Katz, 1996).   
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In the early years of public assistance, cash benefits were the only element 
considered as “welfare” before other programs were integrated into the welfare system. 
For example, the food stamp-program (which has origins from the New Deal) was 
initially regarded as a nutrition program, designed to help low -income families afford a 
healthier diet. Hunger in the United States became a major theme in the 1968 Presidential 
campaign, and in 1974, President Nixon expanded the program and established its 
interaction with AFDC and required all states to offer the program. Additionally, all 
AFDC families were eligible for food stamps and more than 85% of all AFDC families 
received food stamps. The food stamp program did regard AFDC benefits as income, so 
for families who received cash, their food stamp benefits were reduced by $.30 for every 
$1 of AFDC cash (Coll, 1995). 
 Like the mothers’ pension plan programs, states had a large discretion on key 
elements of AFDC offered within its state. Key elements that varied by state included the 
standard of need, age of eligible child, and the income levels of family members. The 
federal government, however, tried to create consistency among states regarding work 
requirements and incentives. In 1961, following the inclusion of unemployed parents to 
the list of eligible recipients, states were required to deny benefits to parents who refused 
to work without “good cause”. The following year, the federal government established 
the Community and Work Training program (CWT). The CWT program was established 
to provide employment and training to recipients of ADFC at the prevailing wage rate for 
the work that was performed. However, earnings obtained from employment that was 
used for savings toward “future costs beneficial to dependents” were not calculated in 
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income guidelines. Furthermore, a state’s participation in the program was completely 
voluntary (Katz, 1996).  
  By 1968, the theme of self-sufficiency for welfare recipients began to take form. 
Congress required all states to set up a program called Work Incentive (WIN) for 
“appropriate” AFDC recipients. The WIN program was a national work and training 
program similar to CWT but was mandatory of all states to adopt. The WIN program was 
administered by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare and the Department 
of Labor. All AFDC recipients who were at least sixteen years old or older and had 
children over the age of six, were required to sign up for the program. Individuals who 
participated in the WIN program were guaranteed an incentive made by the federal 
government that would disregard the first $30 earned and one-third of their remaining 
monthly earnings that would have otherwise decreased the amount of their AFDC 
benefits. In 1981, Congress repealed this incentive by instead disregarding the first four 
months of wages in addition to an ongoing amount to account for childcare. Finally, in 
1988, money received by the federal government in earned income tax credit could not be 
regarded as income that would decrease the amount of benefits received by an AFDC 
participant (Katz, 1996).  
 The year 1981 brought even more changes to AFDC.  In this same year, Congress 
then allowed the states to create their own welfare-to-work programs. The federal 
government still, however, authorized funds needed for job searching, community service 
alternatives, and the actual supplement of wages earned by AFDC participants. By 1982, 
the federal government mandated that all states included a mandatory work component to 
its AFDC program. Every state would now have to enforce that any recipient that 
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receives cash benefits would have to either participate in approved subsidized or 
unsubsidized work-related activities in order to maintain their welfare benefits (Katz, 
1996). 
The Family Support Act of 1988 and Welfare Reform 
 With millions of families now receiving welfare, the trend of “self-sufficiency” 
began to take form in Congress. The year 1988 was the beginning of real welfare reform, 
emphasizing self-sufficiency, which laid the foundation for President Clinton’s Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996. On October 13, 1988, 
President George H.W. Bush signed the Family Support Act. The Act provided the 
inclusion of Medicaid as an official component of the welfare system. Every state was 
required to provide Medicaid to AFDC recipients for twelve months after a family 
transitioned from welfare to work. States were also permitted to offer Medicaid to 
“medically needy” individuals whose income was above AFDC limits, but not greater 
than one-third higher than income of an equivalent family size that received benefits 
(Rom, 1989). 
Although the Family Support Act brought or expanded many new areas to the existing 
welfare system, the Act focused primarily on three major areas to promote self-
sufficiency. These three areas included child support enforcement, training and job 
opportunities for ADFC recipients, and support services for AFDC families who 
transitioned from welfare to self-sufficiency. All of these items were also key 
components of Bill Clinton’s welfare reform act (PRWORA, U.S. Public Law 104-193). 
 Title I of the Family Support Act addressed child support and the establishment of 
paternity. Child support enforcement was not a new concept, as it was initially created 
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under the Social Security Act along with welfare programs. In 1975, welfare recipients 
were required to issue information regarding a non-custodial parent in order to enforce 
child support. Amendments regarding child support in 1984 allowed states to issue 
income withholdings to employers after a one-month lapse in payments by the non-
custodial parent. The Family Support Act amended child support by allowing the Child 
Support Enforcement program to issue income-withholding notices to employers of non-
custodial parents immediately upon opening of the child support order. Exceptions were 
made only if both parents submitted in writing an alternative method of child support to 
the agency (Rom, 1989). 
 The size of a child support award for a custodial parent was also addressed in the 
Family Support Act of 1988. The Act required cases to be reviewed every four years in 
order to determine if pay amounts were still appropriate. Caseloads were allowed to be 
re-determined at any time at the request of the parent or the agency. The Act also 
addressed the establishment of paternity by non-custodial parents. Beginning in 1992, 
states were penalized if paternity was not established for a given proportion of children 
born out of wedlock and receiving AFDC benefits.  Lastly, the Act allowed 
unemployment benefits to be reported to the Child Support Enforcement department, and 
earnings were withheld to comply with the child support order the same way wages from 
employment would (Rom, 1989).  
 Title II of the Family Support Act introduced a new welfare- to- work program 
known as the Job Opportunity and Basic Skills training program (JOBS).  With the 
previous national welfare-to-work program, states were not funded for providing 
necessary training to participants for the jobs in which the participants were referred. The 
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JOBS program was established in order to provide training and basic skills education to 
welfare recipients in order to prevent lifelong dependence on welfare programs. The state 
agency that operated the AFDC program was able to specify the components of the JOBS 
program for each recipient on a case-by-case basis; however, every program must include 
some form of education and job readiness skills in order to prepare participants for the 
workforce. The federal government allotted ninety percent of the costs to states needed to 
operate the JOBS program (Rom, 1989). 
 The last major area that the Family Support Act of 1988 addressed was supportive 
service for families, identified in Title III of the Act. Each state was required to guarantee 
childcare for recipients who participated in employment, training, or educational 
activities. Furthermore, states were also required to provide childcare for one-year after a 
participant leaves welfare to become employed full-time. Parent co-pays were calculated 
based on the family’s ability to pay (Rom, 1989). 
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 
(PRWORA) 
 As stated earlier, several amendments, Acts, and laws were implemented or 
changed throughout the history of welfare in the United States for several different 
reasons. However, one theme that earned the most attention was that of self-efficiency 
and responsibility for welfare recipients. Many believed that the existing welfare program 
created lifelong dependency on the system, and that a new reform was necessary to 
promote self-efficiency. Critics voiced that each amendment that allowed multiple family 
members to receive benefits further encouraged generational dependency on the system 
(Born, Hetling, & Ovwigho, 2007). The concept of self-sufficiency was a major theme in 
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the 1992 Presidential campaign.  Instead of adding to the existing program like previous 
reform initiatives had done, President Clinton instead changed welfare as America once 
knew it. After a variety of vetoes and revisions and years of compilation of data, the 
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA) 
was signed by President Bill Clinton on August 22, 1996 (PRWORA, U.S Public Law 
104-193).  
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) 
 The PRWORA changed the name of cash benefits from AFDC to Temporary 
Assistance to Needy Families (TANF). The welfare program was also changed from an 
entitlement program to a block grant program. In the entitlement program, any person 
who met the requirements for receiving benefits was entitled to receiving the benefits if 
they applied. As a block grant, states receive funding for the program by the federal 
government, but persons to receive benefits are now left to the discretion of the state. 
 The main areas addressed by the PRWORA include helping welfare recipients 
make the transition from welfare to work and promoting responsibility. In order to help 
participants transition from welfare to work, the PRWORA added specific work 
requirements necessary to maintain cash benefits. Under the new law, states were 
required to ensure that fifty-percent of recipients work or be engaged in work-related 
activities for at least twenty hours per week the first year, with a subsequent increase to at 
least thirty hours per week in FY 2000. Two-parent families are required to work at least 
thirty-five hours per week. Work related activities included subsidized and unsubsidized 
employment, on-the-job-training, community service, and providing childcare services to 
individuals who participate in community service, however no more than twenty percent 
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of caseloads in any state can count vocational training as meeting the mandatory work 
requirements (U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, 1996). 
 Perhaps the most notable change made to the welfare system through PRWORA 
was the “lifetime limit” imposed on those who receive cash benefits. The new reform 
mandates that families have a lifetime limit of five years for receiving cash benefits. 
States are allowed to exempt twenty percent of their caseloads from the lifetime limit. 
Exemptions typically include pausing the five-year “clock” for life events such as the 
birth of a new child, attending an educational program that leads to a degree, 
hospitalization, etc.  States that successfully moved participants from welfare to work 
between FY 1999 to 2003 received a performance bonus from the federal government. 
 The second major component addressed by the PRWORA is promoting 
responsibility. A major factor that promotes responsibility is child support enforcement. 
In 1970, single mothers headed the household in one in every eight families with 
children. By 1998, this figured doubled to one in every four families. Of these single-
mother households, nearly 40 percent were poor and another 45 percent were near poor 
by the year 2000. These startling figures prompted the U.S. government to take action 
against fathers who abandon their children, thereby, requiring mothers to rely on the 
assistance of welfare (Garfinkle, Huan, & Waldfogel, 2003). 
Although mandatory child support enforcement for welfare recipients was already 
a part of the existing welfare system, PRWORA established several amendments to make 
it easier to track down non-custodial parents. For example, the law established the 
Federal Case Registry and National Directory of New Hires. This law made it mandatory 
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for employers to report all new hires to the registry so that non-custodial parents could be 
tracked and compliance can begin immediately (Wolk, 1999).  
 The new reform also simplified paternity establishment, making it easier and 
faster to establish paternity. Families are now able to establish legal paternity in the 
hospital before a newborn is even brought home. By signing the voluntary 
acknowledgement of paternity, the father can now be legally liable without lengthy DNA 
testing. TANF recipients who refuse to comply with paternity establishment or releasing 
the information of the non-custodial parent to the department will have their monthly 
cash benefits reduced by at least twenty-five percent. The new law also imposed tougher 
penalties on non-compliant parents, which included expanding wage garnishments, 
allowing states to suspend and revoke professional and driver’s licenses, and seizing 
assets (Wolk, 1999).  
 The new welfare reform also addressed teen pregnancy. In order for a teen parent 
to receive TANF benefits, the teen mother must live at home with her parent(s) or 
responsible adult, and participate in training or educational activities. Furthermore, 
beginning in FY 1998, the federal government added $50 million a year to the Maternal 
and Child Health Block grant for abstinence education. In addition, the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services developed a new strategy to help prevent non-marital teen 
births by assuring that at least twenty-five percent of communities have teen pregnancy 
prevention programs (Cherlin & Hao, 2004).  
Studies that Measured Effectiveness of Welfare Reform 
 An article by Connolly et al. (2000) tested the theory of declined welfare 
caseloads even before the signing of the PRWORA. This study utilized monthly panel-
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data from welfare reform programs on state levels that were comparative to the federal 
PRWORA. The following work waivers categorized the welfare reform programs: work 
requirements, time limits, financial incentives, and parental responsibility. Various 
conditions of the economy were measured by per capita employment and unemployment 
rates. 
 The caseloads studied only included female AFDC recipients between the ages of 
15 and 44.  The researchers also believed that it would be more effective to study the 
number of caseloads rather than the number of AFDC recipients. AFDC recipients 
account for each person on a particular case, which include children, babies, etc. 
However, only the head of the household will make the decisions to remain on welfare or 
leave welfare for work. Therefore, the researchers believe that most legislation regarding 
welfare reform is centered around the needs and behaviors of the head of households, 
thereby making the measurement of caseloads more relevant to measuring the effects of 
welfare reform.  
The researchers used a time trend analysis that accounted for variations in AFDC 
caseloads resulting from national and political trends, which allowed enough nonlinearity 
to capture varying states of the economy, and caseloads. The results of the static model 
showed that states that had both time limits and work incentive welfare waivers saw a 
decrease in caseloads. However, states that only had a work incentive waiver alone 
experienced a 0.3% increase in caseloads. States that combined all work incentives 
showed a 0.55 % reduction in AFDC caseloads. The results of the static model concludes 
that states which implement all four work waiver categories can only expect to see a 
0.3% decline in caseloads after 24 months of the waiver’s approval. Therefore, it is safe 
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to conclude that the type of work waiver makes a significant difference in the reduction 
of caseloads. Thus, the reduction in caseloads due to welfare reform was overall very 
low. 
 The second part of the study included a dynamic model that accounted for 
caseloads that adjusted to past caseload levels and economic conditions. Connolly et al 
(2000) reported that the “results of the dynamic model indicated that a one-percentage 
point increase in the unemployment rate that lasts for five months results in a 1.7%  
increase per capita caseloads in the short-run. Similarly, a 1 % decrease in employment 
per capita lasting for six months leads to a 0.7 % increase in caseloads.”  Therefore, 
although there is indeed an inverse relationship between employment and unemployment 
rates and caseloads, the findings show a relatively small margin. 
 The study by Connolly et al. (2000) used a simulation designed to further evaluate 
the dynamic model. In the simulation model, the researchers presented the top five states 
that showed significant reduction in caseloads. The major area of focus consisted of 
analyzing the type of welfare waivers that each of the top five states had in place at the 
time of the studies since the type of waiver clearly makes the greatest difference on 
increasing or decreasing caseloads. The researchers performed simulations for states with 
work incentive waivers but no responsibility waivers, those with both work and 
responsibility waivers, and those with responsibility but not work incentive waivers. The 
results for the simulation were shown as follows: 
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Table 2: Percentage of 1993-1996 Caseload Reduction Explained by Welfare Reform and 
Economic Activity  
State Percentage in 
Caseload, Jan. 1993 
– Sept. 1996 
Percent of 
Reduction 
Explained by 
Welfare Reform 
Percent Explained 
by Cyclical and 
Seasonal 
Fluctuation 
Wisconsin -48 16 22 
Oregon -43 11 32 
Wyoming -43 -22 27 
Oklahoma -36 -9 33 
North Dakota -36 6 35 
Top 5 caseload 
reducers 
-41 6 29 
United States -18 -9 66 
States with work 
incentive but not 
responsibility 
waivers 
-13 -41 98 
States with both 
types of waivers 
-16 -26 79 
States with 
responsibility but 
not work incentive 
waivers 
-27 11 40 
Note: A negative sign in the second column implies that the welfare reforms in the state are associated with 
an increase in welfare caseloads 
Connolly et.al (2000) explained the simulation results of the above table as follows:  
As shown in Row 8 of Table 2 [“States with work incentives but no responsibility 
waivers”], the caseload decline would have been 41 percent lager for states in the 
first group (18.3 percent instead of 13 percent) were it not for welfare reform, 
while in states with responsibility but no work incentive waivers welfare reform 
accounted for 11 percent of the overall 27 percent decline (row 10) (2000). 
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 Connolly et al. (2000) concluded that economic incentives were more responsible 
for reducing welfare caseloads than welfare reform. They also note that the type of 
welfare reform has a huge influence in on caseloads. According to this study, states that 
had work-incentive waivers saw the greatest changes in AFDC caseloads. However, the 
researchers believe that in the long- run, work incentive waivers will actually increase 
AFDC caseloads, as unemployed individuals will turn to the AFDC program for benefits 
and job leads. Overall, the researchers believed that nationally, AFDC caseloads would 
have declined an additional 9 percent had it not been for the welfare reform programs.  
 A different study conducted by Danielson and Klerman (2008) suggested 
something quite different from the findings of the previous case. The above study 
conducted by Connolly et al (2000) evaluated the effects of welfare reform before the 
PRWORA was signed by President Bill Clinton and was implemented nationwide. 
However, the study entitled Did Welfare Reform Cause the Decline in Caseloads by 
Danielson et, al (2008) used data from AFDC reforms as well as TANF data from the 
actual PRWORA instead of similar pilot programs. This technique was used in order to 
provide a more accurate snapshot of what really lead to the decline of welfare cases 
following the implementation of welfare reform. 
 Similar to the Connolly et al (2000) study, this study focuses on four 
measurements of welfare reform which include financial incentives, sanctions (penalties 
for non-compliance), time-limits, and diversions (temporary assistance used to prevent 
families from being added as a regular caseload) that characterized the shift from AFDC 
to TANF.  This case is one of very few cases that examine welfare caseloads during the 
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early 2000 period, which experienced various states of the economy and periods of 
relatively stable welfare caseloads. 
 The financial incentives that the researchers studied included state welfare 
policies that allowed a smaller amount of employment earnings to be counted against 
welfare benefits. These “financial incentives” allow welfare recipients to earn more 
money while still receiving TANF. Previous studies show that these financial incentives 
often raise the welfare caseloads in the short-run. Several studies show that legislators 
and supporters of financial incentives as a component of welfare reform, proposed that 
once participants are in contact with the workforce, they are more likely to stay in the 
workforce (Becerra et al. 1998; Bos et al., 1999; Hendra and Michalopoulos 1999; 
Moffitt 1999; Michalopoulos et al., 2000; Miller et al., 2000; Ziliak et al., 2000). 
 The second component studied in this research was the work-related sanctions. 
TANF recipients that do not participate in work activities risk losing their cash benefits. 
Danielson and Klerman (2008) hypothesized that these sanctions would reduce welfare 
caseloads, even if it were a “mechanical effect” (i.e. decreased caseloads vs. participants 
who willingly leave the program). It was proposed also that sanctions might deter some 
people from applying for cash benefits, while motivating those who do receive benefits to 
find jobs sooner and leave welfare. Several studies indicate that stringent sanctions 
negatively impact welfare caseloads ranging from 16% to 39% (CEA, 1999; Rector and 
Youssef, 1999; Mead, 2000; MaCurdy et al., 2002). 
 The third area of focus in this research was the time limits on aid receipt. Previous 
studies suggest that welfare caseloads are likely to decline among families during the first 
few months of use of welfare benefits (Motiff 1983; Miller and Sanders 1997; Keane and 
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Motiff 1998; Grogger and Michalopoulos 1999; and Keane and Wolpin 2000). They 
suggest that this decline is due to the “anticipatory” effect that the family feels knowing 
that reaching the sixty-month expiration date will banish cash benefits for life. The 
authors mention that limited data has been conducted to actually test what effects time 
limits have on recipients wanting to leave the program, so this article should provide new 
data on this topic (Swann 2005). 
 The final TANF component that the authors study in this article is welfare 
diversions. Diversion programs assist families who have a temporary emergency by 
giving the family one-lump sum of cash, as opposed to the family becoming a normal 
monthly welfare case. Specifics of diversion programs vary from state to state, but mostly 
all programs grant money to the family that is equivalent to 2 to 4 months of what they 
would have received monthly if they were receiving welfare benefits. Previous literature 
suggests that a reduction in families entering the program may be the result of diversion 
programs (Grogger, Haider, and Klerman 2003). 
 Danielson and Klerman (2008) also examined the economic effects on decreasing 
welfare caseloads. Previous studies, such as the one conducted by Connolly et al. (2000) 
indicate that the economy does in fact play a large role in decreasing welfare caseloads, 
however, the effects are variable. Data used in this analysis was from the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics’ Unemployment Statistics program and earnings data from the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages. 
 The researchers used data from the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services to collect monthly data on state-level welfare caseloads. In contrast to the 
previous study, the researchers here did not limit the caseloads to “child only” or single-
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parent cases, as this info was inconsistent over time. In addition, using “child-only” cases 
would have presented the internal validity threat of maturation, as caseloads would have 
dropped as children reached the age limit for receiving benefits. Therefore, the 
researchers used the total number of caseloads without indicating the specific case-type. 
Time-trend data was analyzed using binary variables that were “switched on” in the 
month that the state implemented the policy.  
 The researchers conclude that the largest factor contributing to welfare caseload 
decline among the four elements of reform studied was “time-limits”. In order to measure 
this element, researcher’s distinguished anticipatory time-limit effects and biased effects 
using a binary variable to indicate whether any recipient could have reached the time 
limit, and a variable measuring the length of time since the first recipients could have 
reached the time limit.  Based on the results of this equation, the authors conclude that 
recipients who anticipated the lifetime expiration of benefits were more likely to leave 
the program. However, this result only appeared to be relevant in the short-term. Another 
area of interest was the effect of sanctions, or families being dropped from the program 
for non-compliance with work –related requirements. Sanctions appeared to decrease 
welfare caseloads, while financial incentives increased caseloads. 
 The most important factor was determining to what extent the economy decreased 
caseloads. As mentioned previously, the researchers combined data from AFDC and 
TANF caseloads to perform a simulation that simplified and demonstrated the complex 
findings of the static model. The authors conclude that the most appropriate measure of 
discovering the effects of the economy was to use a shorter time period than similar 
previous studies (stopping at FY 2000). Using this shorter period, policies explained just 
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over 9 percent of the decline, while the economy explained 19 percent (Danielson and 
Klerman 2008). 
 Although the results of the shorter time-frame model suggest that the economy 
explains a higher percentage of the welfare caseload decline, the researchers draw a 
different overall conclusion. The researchers conclude that from February 1992 to 
February 2005, “the measured policies explain only about 10 percentage points, and the 
economy explains 5 percentage points. Other unmeasured factors apparently play a larger 
role” (pg. 724). Therefore, it is safe to conclude that welfare reform, in some respect, was 
indeed beneficial to the decline in caseloads, although more micro-level studies may be 
necessary in order to pinpoint the dramatic decrease in caseloads shortly after the 
PRWORA was signed.  
 Kaushal and Kaestner (2001) examined the events that led to the rapid decline in 
welfare caseloads as well as the success of welfare reform on its target participants, 
single mothers. Kaushal and Kaestner (2001) used an approach similar to previous 
studies in examining these theories. The article is entitled From Welfare to Work: Has 
Welfare Reform Worked? The researchers of this article conclude that less educated, 
single mothers moved from welfare to work in significant numbers. The question was 
raised as to whether welfare reform actually moved recipients into the workforce, or 
resulted in their employment.  
 The researchers used data from the Census Bureau’s March 1995 to 1999 series of 
Current Population Surveys (CPS), which included a sample of 62,500 homes that were 
interviewed. The data from this census included family characteristics such as family 
size, number of children under the age of six, number of children under the age of 18, 
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family income and composition, which were all used as controls in the regression 
analyses. The areas of welfare reform that were researched in this study were time limits 
on benefits and family cap provisions. Family cap provisions refer to states that impose a 
cap on benefits regardless of the addition of a new baby or dependent person added to the 
caseload. Although encouraged, family caps are not mandatory for the state to impose.  
 Even though the passage of the PRWORA made welfare reform mandatory in all 
states, the states still have significant discretion on how the TANF program is 
implemented. In order to properly evaluate welfare reform, researchers felt that the rigor 
of the reform in each state made a significant difference on its effects. Intensity of 
welfare programs were measured using one of four dummy variables: low intensity, 
medium intensity, and high intensity. Low-intensity reform referred to a state reform 
program that has a TANF program but no time limit on benefits or family cap. A medium 
intensity program is a state reform program that has either a time-limit provision or a 
family cap provision, but not both. Finally, the high intensity program has both a family 
cap provision as well as a time limit.  
 The goal of this research was to discover what effects welfare reform, namely 
time limits and family cap provisions (or other variables such as the economy) had on 
employment and fertility rates among individuals on or at risk of being on TANF. To 
analyze employment outcomes, the researchers used the difference –in-differences 
method. The sample group included women between the ages of 18 to 44 with twelve or 
fewer years of education, as this demographic represents more than 80 percent of those 
on welfare. The target group was women from the sample group that were also unmarried 
with children. Finally, the researchers used two comparison groups. The first comparison 
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group consisted of women from the sample who were married with children, while the 
second comparison group consisted of women who were unmarried without children. 
Both comparison groups are unlikely to be affected by welfare reform, however in order 
to eliminate any potential biases or the effects of other factors that may alter the results, 
the researchers used the two comparison groups and subtracted the before and after 
results of each group. 
 This study also examined was the effects of welfare reform on fertility rates. 
Previous research has indicated that welfare reform does influence fertility for families on 
or at risk of welfare, but evidence of how much welfare reform impacted fertility, at the 
time of this study was inconclusive (Motiff, 1999). The target group for this analysis 
included unmarried women without children. The researchers used this group as the 
target population because they believed that these women were most likely to have a 
child out of wedlock, and be at risk for welfare benefits. There were also two comparison 
groups. One comparison group consisted of married women with less than twelve years 
of education, while the second comparison group consisted of unmarried women with 
between thirteen and fifteen years of education. The rationale for using two comparison 
groups in this analysis is the same rationale used in the employment sample.  
 The overall research strategy for this study was the difference-in-differences 
analysis, which is used consistently as a tool for analysis throughout this study. The 
results of the difference-indifferences analysis obtain allowed the researchers to draw 
conclusions regarding the effects of welfare reform on labor force participation, hours of 
work maintained by individuals who leave welfare for work, and fertility rates of those 
affected by welfare reform policies. The equation showed that time limits increased 
24 
 
 
employment by 2.1 to 3.2 percentage points for unmarried women with children. For 
unmarried women with children who have less than a high school diploma, time limits on 
welfare benefits increased employment between 5.1 and 10.1 percentage points with its 
greatest effect shown to the comparison group of unmarried women without children. 
 The results of the effects of family cap provisions revealed relatively low 
statistically significant results. For unmarried women with children with less than a high 
school diploma, family caps increased employment between 3.7 and 6.5 percentage 
points, with the greatest significance shown in comparison to women without children. 
The researchers were also interested in the how these welfare reform provisions affected 
how many hours of work were maintained once in the workforce. The results showed that 
the average overall hours of work per week increased due to time-limits impositions by 
1.832 to 2.699 for unmarried mothers without a high school diploma. Furthermore, hours 
of work also increased for unmarried women with a high school diploma from 0.505 to 
1.987. High intensity reform programs increased hours of unmarried women with 
children who have less than a high school diploma by 3.163 to 5.677 hours of work per 
week. 
 The final outcome that was tested in this study was how welfare reform 
influenced fertility rates. The results indicated that time limits and family caps had a 
small impact on fertility rates. While low and medium intensity reform programs had 
small effects on fertility, ironically, high intensity programs showed no change in fertility 
rates among those who would most likely be affected by the reform. 
 The researchers of this study conclude that welfare reform was indeed a 
significant factor in reducing welfare caseloads between March 1995 and March 1999. 
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They further conclude that welfare reform was responsible for decreasing caseloads by 28 
percent for unmarried women with children who have less than a high school diploma. 
The women that entered the workforce also maintained on average approximately 29 
hours of work per week. The researchers believed that the new incentives for work, such 
as earned income tax credit, and the ability to still receive benefits once employed helped 
to motivate the target group into the workforce more than any other factors. 
Discussion of Articles 
A summary of the results of the articles discussed in this paper are shown in Table 3: 
Table 3: Summary of Articles 
Article Sample Used Date of Study Reform Used Conclusion on 
Findings 
Danielson and 
Klerman (2008) 
Does Not Specify 1989-2005 AFDC and 
TANF 
Welfare reform 
declined 
caseloads more 
than the 
economy, but still 
in small 
measures. 
Unmeasured 
factors seemed to 
play a larger role. 
Connolly et al. 
(2000) 
AFDC Caseloads 
for all 50 states 
for women 
between the ages 
of 15 to 44. 
1987-1996 AFDC programs 
that had reform 
waivers similar 
to TANF reform. 
The economy 
played a larger 
role in declines, 
although some 
welfare reform 
incentives were 
more effective in 
reducing 
caseloads than 
others 
Kaushal and 
Kaestner (2001) 
62,500 AFDC 
caseloads of 
married and 
unmarried women 
with children 
1995-1999 AFDC and 
TANF 
Welfare reform 
was successful in 
increasing 
employment and 
declining 
caseloads 
 
 The previous articles study the effectiveness of welfare reform primarily through 
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the measurement of caseloads. Furthermore, they all present a unique perspective on what 
contributed to the decline in caseloads following the welfare reform. Although each study 
provided a unique prospective regarding this topic, each article did in fact have 
limitations. Connolly et al. (2000) observed female recipients aged 15 to 44 years. 
Economic activity was measured via the use of the log of the ratio of unemployment for 
this population. However, this age group was possibly contaminated due to maturation. 
The legal minimum age to work in the United States is 16, so girls at age 15 are surely to 
be unemployed. Secondly, girls between the ages of 15 and 18 are most likely still 
enrolled in high school full-time, and are very likely to be unemployed. As these women 
finish school or become of legal age to work, it is possible that this transition will look 
like an improvement in employment. Therefore, using this age group may contaminate 
the results regarding how greatly the economy influenced caseload decline. 
 The second article by Danielson et al. (2008) was highly complex and required a 
good deal of analyzing to understand the complexities of the study. Aside from that, the 
article never mentioned whether it was examining all fifty states or whether there was a 
specific sample size (i.e., randomly selected caseloads of women between the ages of 20 
and 25) that was focused upon. Without the reader being aware of what sample size was 
studied, it is difficult to understand how greatly the percentages revealed in the results 
were that great of an impact.  
 In contrast, the article by Kaushal and Kaestner (2001) utilized very specific 
sample sizes and provided a clear explanation of the significance of findings. This study, 
however, also had limitations that may have altered the results. For example, the 
researchers indicate that the comparison groups used in this study consisted of women 
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who were least likely to be affected by welfare reform (married women with children 
with 12 or fewer years of education). However, this group was still very likely to be 
affected by welfare reform due to the AFDC-UP program that was an alternative option 
offered during the period of this study. The AFDC-UP (unemployed parent) program 
mandated all states to offer welfare benefits to two-parent households that had at least 
one unemployed parent in the home. The program was created in order to encourage 
marriage and two-parent households. Given that this demographic is also very minimally 
educated, unemployment or underemployment is likely to be high, leaving this 
demographic very likely to turn to welfare. (Winkler, 1995).   
All of the articles agree that welfare reform played a small factor in the decline in 
welfare, but the economy was also a major factor of decline. These findings may leave 
readers wondering if welfare reform was really worth the hassle. Furthermore, in times of 
a difficult economy (such as the one the U.S. is experiencing now) are welfare caseloads 
likely to soar, or would that information be misleading, as many individuals who may 
have still been on welfare reached the lifetime limit of benefits? In either case, the 
question of how the economy affects welfare caseloads is one that is ongoing, and likely 
to provide new and useful information with each new study.  
Conclusions 
 The articles clearly indicate that welfare reform is something that may be an 
ongoing issue as times change. Based on the previously mentioned studies, welfare 
reform was successful in many areas however; other unstudied factors may have played a 
larger role in promoting self-sufficiency, as measured by the decline in caseloads. The 
literature review gave a historical overview on welfare reform. In the earlier origins of 
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welfare, welfare reform was necessary in order to include more people who could benefit 
from the program. As times evolved however, more emphasis leaned towards limiting the 
amount of individuals that needed welfare, and especially discouraging long-term 
dependence on the program. This evolution of moving towards self-sufficiency did not 
appear to be a partisan position. Republican President H.W. Bush signed the Family 
Support Act which heavily promoted responsibility; however, it was President Clinton, a 
democrat, who ultimately changed welfare to a limited, responsibility-promoting 
resource. But was Bill Clinton’s reform just a political anecdote used to win conservative 
votes? 
 If one thing could be changed regarding the current welfare reform, it would 
probably be eliminating the many loopholes that exist in the program that allow a person 
to still receive cash benefits for an extended period of time. Many exemptions exist that 
may serve as substitutes for mandatory work requirements, thereby, pausing the lifetime 
benefit clock (e.g. providing childcare, performing unsubsidized community service, and 
completing job search forms). These loopholes only require people to put forth a small 
amount of effort in terms of promoting self-sufficiency. 
 The loopholes mentioned above seem to contradict the welfare reform goal of 
self-sufficiency and instead encourage dependence. Further research regarding whether 
reform elements actually create dependency instead of self-sufficiency is needed. Other 
areas of future research may include, investigating if these potentially dependent 
elements are biased towards demographics more susceptible to welfare, if prolonged 
welfare is generational and how can that be addressed in future reform, and finally, is 
welfare reform effective in the long-run.  
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 It is quite possible that loopholes will indeed encourage more conservative 
politicians to re-visit welfare reform; however, equal pressure may also be felt by 
democratic leaders to do more to encourage self-sufficiency. The economy and various 
other domestic issues will always affect the trends in welfare caseloads; therefore welfare 
reform will be an ongoing issue as times change. In addition, all legislators will want to 
know if welfare reform is still achieving its designated goals. Hopefully, however, every 
welfare reform set forth will be an even better initiative to enhance the betterment of the 
welfare system and the citizens of the United States. 
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